We shall now return to a particular example of the subjectivism which we have just attempted to expound, namely Magisterial Personalism (23). The importance with which this method of analysis has been invested by the Magisterium in recent times in respect to the themes treated in this book shall require a lengthy treatment.
(op.cit.and my essay published by Rorate Caeli (internet) in January 2011). This Order in essentially anthropocentric in the sense that it represents a movement away from God towards man, as may be clearly seen in comparing the New with the Old Order, its predecessor. It may be yet more clearly seen in the practices to which this anthopocentricism has ledin recent years, by a sort of inner dynamic: the use of the vernacular, the celebration of the Mass with the back to the tabernacle and facing the people, Communion in the hand, the autocelebration of the ‚Community’; not to speak of more heinous abuses such as the vision of the Mass as a party or feast, creativity, clowns, dancing-girls, laughter, and applause. In this regard Cd. Ratzinger himself in his autobiography Aus meinem Leben: Erinnerungen (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 1998 p.174) speaks of times when the liturgy is conceived etsi Deus non daretur – as though God did not exist.)
(23) We understand personalism here as that system of personal ethics which is grounded in the person rather than in being. We contrast it to personalism as a doctrine of political ethics which gives precedence to the person over the common good, and personalism in metaphysics which defines the person in terms of substance rather than functions.
This method first came to light in the documents of the Second Vatican Council, particularly Gaudium et Spes, and is manifest in the Encyclical Humanae Vitae of Pope Paul VI, as in many magisterial documents promulgated under Pope John Paul II, e.g. the Catechism of the Catholic Church (‘The New Catechism’), Veritatis Splendor, and Familiaris Consortio.
To understand magisterial personalism in theory let us turn to the theoretical exposition of it offered by Pope John Paul II, for whom this philosophy plays an important role. As such it has its origins in the personalism of Max Scheler (1874-1928) and perhaps also that of Emmanuel Mounier (1905-1950). Assuming that Max Scheler, on whom the Pope to be wrote his doctoral thesis, is the principal source for his personalism, let us begin by briefly considering the work of this philosopher.
1. The Personalism of Max Scheler
In the evaluation of Johannes Hirschberger 24 on which the following summary chiefly relies, Scheler brought to its fulfilment the phenomenology of Husserl, a philosophy concerning the object and the nature of things. With its motto Zurück zu den Sachen selbst : back to the things themselves, this philosophy offered a method of discovering the nature of each thing by appropriate use of the senses and reason. Scheler applied this method to the broad themes of value, man, world, and God.
24 1980 in Geschichte der Philosophie Bd. II: Neuzeit und Gegenwart, Verlag Herder Freiburg im Breisgau 11. Auflage.
The phenomenological acquaintance with the nature of things becomes with Scheler an acquaintance with values which are objective qualities of things or persons, and are apprehended (by those who are not impervious to them) by means of acts. Just as sense objects are perceived and concepts are thought, so values are felt. The acquaintance with these values has both an ethical and a psychological interest for Scheler, who created a philosophy of the emotions, notably of sympathy and love.
His teaching on love constitutes an integral part of his philosophy of the human person. The human person is not the hypostasis, the metaphysical substance of the ancients, which would make man a thing among things, but rather a principle of agency continually in motion, who by virtue of his spirit knows the nature of things and feels values, thereby entering into an ideal sphere, where he is free from the law of causal determinism and thus free from the world, and where he can form himself in his ultimate value as person. Persons do not exist, they become: by ‘realizing values’. Man’s action is a form of love which conforms to the inner order of the heart and shares in the world of values and in the final analysis in the Unperson, or proto-person, who is God.
Scheler’s views about the world and God as well as the drive (or Drang) inherent in man we shall leave aside as irrelevant to the matter at hand and as antagonistic to Catholic doctrine.
2. Magisterial Personalism
The future Pope John Paul II was concerned to adapt Scheler’s philosophy to a Thomistic metaphysics. In the following brief summary of his own version of personalism let us concentrate on the central questions of the person, self-determinism, freedom, the dignity of the person, love, value, and truth.25
25 We do this by reference to the book Person and Community: Selected Essays by Karol Wojtyla translated by Theresa Sandok OSM: Catholic Thought from Lublin, Vol. IV, published by P. Lang New York 1993. Works referred to below form chapters of this book unless otherwise stated.
The Pope to be accepts the Thomistic definition of the person (originating from Boethius): persona estrational isnaturae individua substantia.26 The human person is a composite of matter (body) and form (the soul). The latter is the principle of the life and activity of the human being, an activity which operates through the faculties of reason and free will. The soul possesses other faculties of a sensory nature, whether cognitive or appetitive. The later Pope observes that St. Thomas does not speak of the ‘lived experiences of the person’.27
By ‘lived experiences of the person’ he seems to refer to consciousness, particularly love, and self-consciousness, particularly self-consciousness inasmuch as it reveals the action of the will in self-determinism. This self-determinism is identical with freedom. 28 It is a property of the person 29 by which a person directs an act of will towards a value, thereby determining himself, creating himself 30, making himself ‘good’ or ‘evil’ as a human being. Whilst the term ‘person’ has an ontological sense (as defined above), self- determinism enables one to understand it in an ethical sense as well, perhaps even in an additional ontological sense 32 since self-determinism enables self-gift, which is in effect the culmination of personhood. Here 33 he quotes from Gaudium et Spes 23: ‘the human being who is the only creature on earth that God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself or herself except through a disinterested gift of himself or herself.’ As Janet E. Smith observes 34: ‘Talk of ‘gift of self’ is nearly always linked to the imitation of Christ: ‘Jesus asks us to follow Him and to imitate Him along the path of love, a love which gives itself completely to the brethren out of love for God’ Veritatis Splendor 20’.
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 Thomistic Personalism, p. 167. Thomistic Personalism p. 171. The book: Person and Act, II 3. The Personal Structure of Self-Determinism p. 190. ibid 191. ibid 192. ibid 194.
The dignity of the person for the Pope resides in his self-determinism through the free choice of the good, or in other words in his self-giving. To this ethical thesis two theses of a theological nature are added in the Catechism of the Catholic Church 35: ‘The dignity of the human person is rooted in his creation in the image and the likeness of God; it is fulfilled in his vocation to divine beatitude.’
As for love, in the Thomistic understanding approved by the Pope, it draws together and unifies everything in existence. 36 There exists a sensible love and“a true love, the kind of love of others worthy of a human person… in which our sensory energies and desires are subordinated to a basic understanding of the true worth of the object of our love”. 37 This love, which amounts to self- giving, relates to the good that each person is and the good comprised by their union, and should serve as the foundation for all human co-existence. Love thy neighbour is “a thoroughly personalistic principle”. The proper object and subject of love is the person.
33 34 II and Moral Theology’ Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick 1998 p. 81.
35 36 1700. Thomistic Personalism, p. 172. ibid 193. in ‘Natural Law and Personalism in Veritatis Splendor’ in ‘John Paul
The term “value” is used frequently by the Pope, who sometimes substitutes for it the terms “good” or “dignity” (in the case of the person). So for example the object of the will is designated sometimes as value 38 and sometimes as the good39. By willing the value or good (by self-determinism), the agent himself attains a value40 or makes himself good41. This value or good that he attains thus proceeds from himself as its efficient cause. Scheler misses this fact, maintains the Pope, mistakenly viewing value simply as the object of emotion42. The value or good that the person attains (when viewed in the third person) is designated by the Pope as the value of the person43, or, more characteristically, as the dignity of the person.
37 38 39 40 41 42 ibid p. 173. The Personal Structure of Self-Determinism p. 191. Thomistic Personalism p. 172. The Person : Subject and Community p. 230. The Personal Structure of Self-Determinism p. 191. The Problem of the Separation of Experience from the Act in Ethics p. 38-9
Let us turn to the Pope’s notion of truth. He quotes from St. Thomas that “every being is a good from an existential point of view” (in other words inasfar as it exists)44 and proceeds: ‘The consciousness of value, on the other hand, arises in us when that existential good… is evaluated in a certain way, namely is placed, so to speak, under the light of truth. Only then can we speak of the lived experience of value.’ Here he describes the psychological process which he terms ‘evaluation’ by which, in Thomistic terms, a thing is both understood as Being under the aspect of truth and then as Being under the aspect of the good. In everyday language he is speaking of something being first understood and then seen to be good. His notion of truth is Thomistic then, namely a notion of ontological truth: adaequatio rei cum idea eius sive cum intellectu: the being of things insofar as it is recognizable (what in common parlance would roughly be called ‘reality’). This notion is to be distinguished from the notion of logical truth adaequatio intellectus cum re: the correspondence of cognition with being (what in common parlance is simply called ‘truth’).
43 44 Thomistic Personalism p. 173 On the metaphysical and phenomenological Basis of the Moral Norm p. 92.
The influence of Scheler’s philosophy on the Holy Father’s personalism is seen particularly in the concept of self-determinism; the equivalence of self-determinism with love (or ‘self-giving’ in the latter’s thought); the importance of freedom; the concept of value (which the latter particularly ascribes to the person and characteristically refers to as dignity); the objectivity and transcendance (however understood) of values, and, in the Pope’s thinking, of the Good and True to which one arises, ‘going out beyond oneself and somehow rising above oneself’ 45 – almost the ‘ideal sphere’ of Scheler – ; and finally psychology which reveals self-determinism and the lived experience of value. Scheler’s preoccupation with objectivity and psychology of course derives in its turn from phenomenology. 45 The Person : Subject and Community p. 234.
Let us proceed to offer an evaluation of personalism first in general and then in regard to the two formulations outlined above.
3. Evaluation of Personalism
i) Evaluation of Personalism in General
It should be remarked at the outset that personalism is not in itself a complete system of morality, first in that it does not yield a system of general ethics but only a system of personal ethics and to some extent one of social ethics (see the beginning of chapter two); second in that it in itself lacks a metaphysical foundation, which is supplied in magisterial personalism by the Thomistic ontology of the person, the true, the good, and love. Furthermore even in conjunction with a metaphysical foundation it remains merely a system of ethics or moral philosophy and not a system of moral theology (see the beginning of chapter one).
Its general advantage, in which it may be seen to supplement the Thomistic ethics, would appear to be that it helps analyze and determine actions relating to a person, by reference to the person himself, at least on the natural level. Indeed in accordance with the previously enunciated principle agere sequitur esse it is necessary to understand the nature of the person in order to analyze and determine an action that relates to him. Personalism offers such an understanding. Moreover it is clear that it is the dignity of the person, or in other words that which is most excellent, most elevated, in him that must principally be respected in any action relating to him. Personalism provides a foundation for this dignity of the person, again at least on the natural level.
As far the themes of this book are concerned, it is perhaps reflection upon the brutal maltreatment and massacre of millions of people during the World Wars and in the Communist republics that has made men of good will more aware of the dignity of the person and has led them to adopt it as a principle uniting them in their resistance to such evils. A comparable maltreatment and massacre in the areas of sexuality and abortion will justify analysis in similar terms; the extent to which the dignity of the person can however constitute a principle of unity compatible with Catholic teaching will be discussed in the latter pages of this chapter.
ii) Evaluation of Scheler’s Personalism
Let us proceed to evaluate the personalism of Max Scheler by way of a brief glance at his mentor Edmund Husserl. Although the latter with his motto: Zurück zu den Sachen selbst was concerned to construct an objectivist philosophy in reaction to the subjectivist philosophies of Hume and Kant, he nevertheless falls prey to a certain subjectivity, at least from the standpoint of the perennial philosophy. For with his dictum Erkenntnis ist Anschauung: Knowledge is Observation, by which he expressed his theory that the nature of things is known by observation, he presupposed that a thing consists of its observable qualities, thereby leaving out of consideration the actual existence of the thing. In brief, the perennial philosophy teaches that a thing consists of both essence and existence; Husserl teaches that it consists of essence alone. By bracketing out existence, he detaches himself from objective reality, and thereby falls into subjectivism.
Scheler adopts Husserl’s epistemological principle Erkenntnis ist Anschauung, and applies it to values. Husserl’s theory that the nature of things is known by observation becomes in Scheler the theory that the value of things is known by feelings, and just as Husserl detaches the essence of things from the things themselves, so Scheler detaches the value of things from the things themselves, thereby also falling into subjectivism. According to the perennial philosophy by contrast, fthe goodness of a thing is identical with the thing itself: ens et bonum convertuntur. Moreover there is also such a thing as a moral good (e.g. a morally good action) and a supernatural good (e.g. a morally good action performed by an agent in a state of Grace).
In the perennial philosophy, the faculties of a person that relate to a good of any of these three types, are first the understanding, by which the good is apprehended as true, and then the will (or ‘love’) by which the good is willed. The order of the true hereby takes epistemological precedence over the order of the good. To Scheler, by contrast, the faculties which relate to values are first the feelings by which the value is apprehended, and secondly love, by which the value is realized. The lack of reference to objective truth and understanding entails that Scheler effectively gives precedence to the order of good over the order of true. Indeed in Zur Ethik und Erkenntnislehre46, he writes: der Mensch ist, ehe er ein ens cogitans ist oder ein ens volens, ein ens amans: Man is first of all a loving being before he is ever a knowing or a willing being.
To Scheler the person is a principle of agency who realizes himself as a person by loving, by realizing values. So much, one might say, for the person as viewed ‘from inside’. ‘From outside’, or judging by our acquaintance with a person outside us, a person is, or possesses, a value. According to the principle of Erkenntnis ist Anschauung, I am acquainted with the value that this person is, or possesses, by means of feeling. This feeling gives me an intuitive acquaintance with the person. In the perennial philosophy, the person is understood ontologically: as something which exists, and which has a nature, namely body and soul. He exists; he is not in the process of becoming a person; he does not create himself – except in a moral sense inasmuch as he makes himself good or evil by his actions; he is not a value.
Let us now turn to Scheler’s notion of freedom, first suggesting that two types of freedom may in general be distinguished in the history of human thought: the freedom to do what I desire (or what I, autonomously, consider right), and the freedom to do what is good. The first may be termed subjectivist, the second objectivist. Scheler’s freedom is of the subjectivist type: it is the freedom to do what one desires, the freedom to realize oneself. The freedom of the perennial philosophy, by contrast, is of the objectivist type: the freedom (more fully) to know what is true and to do what is good. Furthermore in the philosophy of Scheler, as in all subjectivist philosophies, freedom is a perfection and plays a primary role because it is the faculty by which the agent attains his end: his self-realization; whereas in the perennial philosophy freedom is a perfection only inasmuch as it may be exercised in relation to the True and the Good; inasmuch as it may be exercised in relation to falsehood and evil it is an imperfection. It plays a secondary role, because the faculties by which the agent attains his end are the intellect and the will, freedom being simply a determination of them. We notice in passing that Scheler describes man’s end in subjectivist terms, by reference to the self: as self- determinism, whereas the perennial philosophy describes it in objectivist terms, by reference to God.
The above evaluation reveals that the fundamental feature of Scheler’s personalism is its subjectivism; on the basis that the fundamental feature of the perennial philosophy is its objectivism, we may conclude that the two systems of thought are in fundamental opposition to each other. Let us proceed to ask how they are reconciled in Magisterial Personalism, first in theory and then in practice.
iii) Evaluation of Magisterial Personalism
a) Magisterial Personalism in Relation to the Perennial Philosophy in Theory
We have seen how the Holy Father adopts terms characteristic of personalism such as value, love, the person, freedom, and self-determinism, and is concerned to give them objective content in accordance with the perennial philosophy: value is identified with the Good, which is subordinated to the True and which is the object of love. The person is the composite of body and soul, his freedom (which is identical to his self-determinism) relates to the Good and the True. Janet E. Smith (op.cit.) shows how his personalism is compatible with objective morality (at least on the natural level), that is with Church teaching on the natural law in the Catechism of the Catholic Church and Veritatis Splendor.
Moving from the general to the particular, let us now briefly consider the personalistic doctrine that self-gift determines personhood, because this doctrine seems to find an echo in Magisterial Personalism (see above), although this is unclear. Noting first that for the purposes of this section we understand ‘self-gift’ as that giving which is a feature of rational love (see the end of the previous chapter) we may certainly admit that self-gift is related to personhood on a deep level, while denying that it determines it ontologically. Its relation to personhood, according to the perennial philosophy, would rather be that of exemplary cause (as an expression of God’s love for Himself and for us).
In fact for the sake of clarity the relation of self-gift to personhood as well as the relation of the body and soul to personhood may be understood in terms of the Aristotelian doctrine of the causes: self-gift is the exemplary cause of the person; the body is the material cause; and the soul is the formal cause. The exemplary cause is an extrinsic cause so it does not determine the person ontologically; the material and the formal causes are by contrast intrinsic causes, so do determine the person ontologically 47.
47 On the basis of such considerations, one may distinguish three errors in defining the relation between self-gift and personhood. The first is to identify the two as does Scheler, or even certain Catholic writers such as Fr. R. D. Johann, S.J.in his article on “Love” in the Catholic Encyclopedia: “The truth is that the self exists only in this relationship (its loving relationship to Being) and apart from it is nothing at all.” The second error is to state that self-gift determines personhood.
We see how personalism (that of Scheler) is adapted to objective truth and goodness on the natural level, that is in theory. Let us proceed to ask how it is adapted to natural truth and goodness in practice.
b) Magisterial Personalism in Relation to the Perennial Philosophy in Practice
We observe first that natural truth and goodness are neglected. In Humanae Vitae for example, as we shall show later (in chapter 5), natural law arguments are for the most part ignored, and in Familiaris Consortio, a lengthy encyclical in 86 sections treating of family love, the objective foundation of love is never revealed.
We observe secondly that personalistic terminology such as Freedom, Value, Love, and Truth, is in practice not defined. The immediate consequence is that the terms are unclear: the term ‘value’ for instance is not replaced by the precise philosophical term ‘good’; in itself it has a mercantile sense which has no bearing on personal ethics; the term ‘love’ is notoriously broad; the term ‘truth’ is in common parlance most commonly understood in its logical sense (see above) but is used differently in Magisterial Personalism –ontologically, as we have just attempted to refute. The third error is to be moved by the fact that since self-gift is neither identical to personhood nor determines it ontologically, to ignore the fact that the two are related to each other on a deep level.
indeed in an almost mystical sense as in the phrase: “somehow rising above oneself…” (see above). The consequence of this unclarity is that the terms are taken in the sense in which they are most readily understood, namely for the most part in a subjectivist sense: freedom is taken as the freedom to do what I desire; value is taken as that which I have freely chosen as a value or as the object of my love; love is taken as sensible love.
Indeed, since the Holy Father does not usually situate the terms in the context of the perennial philosophy, one may well ask whether he does not usually understand them in a subjective sense himself, giving the terms a different content at different times in accordance with an eclectic, rather than synthetic, manner of thinking.
We see then how Magisterial Personalism gains a subjectivist character in practice, first by neglecting the objective realm and second by employing terms, which are prima facie subjectivist, without redefining them.
c) Magisterial Personalism in Relation to Faith
If Magisterial Personalism lacks reference to the objective realm on the natural level, it does so also on the supernatural level, as can be seen in the magisterial treatment of the dignity of the person. For the Pope, this dignity resides in man’s self-determinism or self-giving, in his creation in the image and likeness of God, and in his vocation to Divine Beatitude. This self-giving is in fact conceived by him as relating to the creation in the image and likeness of God, for he describes self-giving as free and as directed towards the Good and the True, and the New Catechism 48 explains creation in the image and likeness of God by reference to a spiritual soul, intellect, will, and freedom.
This form of dignity which we have described above (in chapter 2) as the natural form of dignity, has, as there explained, been diminished by Original Sin. The New Catechism does in fact refer to Original Sin “by which man is now inclined to evil and subject to error”49, but does not admit that this has diminished man’s dignity.
As to the supernatural dignity of man, which is ostensibly the most elevated form of dignity (chapter 2), the Catechism remains silent. Although it speaks of man conforming or not to the “good promised by God” 50, attaining the “perfection of Charity which is holiness”, and maturing in Grace 51, it does not identify this charity or holiness with his dignity, nor identify a loss of this charity.
48 49 50 51 1705, 1707, 1700, 1709
Chapter 3: A Novel Tendency in the Magisterium or holiness with a loss of his dignity.
In a similar way, the Pope to be, speaking in a broadcast at the time of the Second Vatican Council “on the Dignity of the Human Person” 52 explains that this dignity (understood in the natural sense) derives from the intellect and free will; and that it is confirmed by the fact of Revelation, namely to the human being made ‘in the image and likeness of God’. He then adds (as quoted earlier): ‘God also became a human being’, redeems man, and ‘permeates the human being with divine Grace…’ Here Redemption and Grace are mentioned but, as explained above (in chapter 2), are not taken as the ground for the supernatural dignity of man, but simply as an added ground for man’s natural dignity. The endeavor to subordinate the supernatural to the natural realm is also seen in the magisterial treatment of love as will be exemplified in the second half of chapter 4 and as is expressed in the statement mentioned above: “love thy neighbour is a thoroughly personalistic principle.”
We see then how Magisterial Personalism lacks reference to the objective realm both on the natural and the supernatural levels. What is the reason for this? one might ask.
Magisterial Personalism neglects the objective natural order because, whatever its theoretical claims, it remains a form of personalism and as such is fundamentally subjectivist.
Why does it neglect the objective supernatural order? The answer has already been given at the beginning of this section: Personalism is a system of philosophy, of ethics, and not of moral theology. As a system of philosophy it relies on the senses and the reason for attaining truth (as we have seen clearly with Scheler and his mentor Husserl); senses and reason can only attain natural truth, and never supernatural truth.
Even when personalism is adapted to a Thomistic metaphysics, it remains a system of philosophy and not of theology. It is true that certain theological elements are added to personalism such as the imitation of Christ and of the Holy Trinity, but other theological elements of central importance for Catholic morality are omitted, such as the supernatural dignity of man and supernatural love, or Charity. If all such relevant elements were incorporated into personalism, it would cease to be a system of moral philosophy but would instead become one of moral theology with personalistic insights. This is indeed its role, for since theology is the higher science, philosophy must serve as her handmaid rather than the reverse.
Magisterial Personalism neglects the objective realm both on the natural and the supernatural level then, because it is subjectivist and because it is merely a philosophy. However sound it may be in theory, however noble in intention (see below), it must be admitted out of respect for the truth, that in practice it is less than felicitous. Its neglect of the objective realm on the natural and supernatural levels represents a shift on both levels from the objective to the subjective, and effectively a shift from the theocentric to the anthropocentric; in addition it represents a shift from the supernatural to the natural level: from Faith to philosophy.
In a word it tends to supplant the perennial philosophy as a teacher of natural truth and to supplant moral theology as a teacher of Catholic morality. It has a limited role to perform when properly applied within personal and social ethics, but here it exceed these limits, leading its adherents into confusion and error.
The sort of error to which it can give rise may be illustrated by the following example: Take a man who is a model of self-giving but in a state of mortal sin. Magisterial personalism would accord him dignity, indeed a high dignity on account of his exemplary self-giving. According to Catholic teaching, by contrast, this man would possess no supernatural dignity and a much diminished natural dignity, so that St. Thomas would say that he possesses no dignity simpliciter: if he died unrepentant he would be condemned to Hell. The clear statements in The New Catechism on the nature of sin would safeguard a reader from falling into such an error, although one must admit that there is a lack of coherence in The New Catechism and in the contemporary teaching of the Magisterium, when taken as a whole.
4. The Motivation of Magisterial Personalism
The motivation of this form of Personalism seems to be the desire to establish moral principles acceptable to all men (of good will). For this reason ‘positive’ elements are brought into the foreground such as the common dignity of man, and ‘negative’ elements are passed over such as Original Sin and Hell; for this reason too, objectivity cedes to subjectivism, and Faith to philosophy. In this connection the broadcast (cited above) by the Pope to be at the time of the Second Vatican Council is revealing. In it he says: “The Council and the Church … regard the call concerning the dignity of the human person as the most important voice of our age 54 (On the Dignity of the Human Person p. 179….) The matter of the dignity of the human person … is certainly an ecumenical element, an element common to all people of genuinely good will.”
Behind the desire to establish moral principles acceptable to all men of good will is the desire, or so it would seem, to unite all men of good will. The deepest motivation of personalism would then be the desire for union, or in other words love, since (as we have argued above) love seeks union.
In commentary it may be said first that universal philosophical principles are indispensable to the establishment of Truth, both natural and supernatural, but they must be sound and can only be applied within the boundaries that are rightfully theirs; otherwise they do not lead to the Truth. Second it may be said that the whole moral law may be expressed by the commandment to love (Mt. 22, 40 and Jn. 13, 34) but that of course this love must be based on truth; otherwise it cannot in any sense be said to be authentic.
In the final analysis, and as we have noted at the beginning of this chapter, Personalism is defective in the priority which it accords to Love over Knowledge, and to the Order of the Good over the Order of the True: a consequence of its radical subjectivity.
The original author of this blog passed away in July of 2016. RIP Father Carota.